Morality and Game Theory

Rational is often mistaken for egoistic but there can be a rational altruism, if we consider behaviour in the long term. Game Theory and specifically evolutionary and cooperation games can show this is true. Incorporating theories of morality into game theory can show that there exists a relationship between morality and game theoretical models. Moral is understood to be cooperative and the main purpose of cooperation to be redistribution. Cooperation in society can be examined with the use of n-person supergame models as well as the science of complexity. Moreover, theories of evolution can be helpful in understanding social behaviour. The outcome should be a normative theory providing rational incentives for individuals to behave morally.

Morality is not always a straightforward idea. A discussion defining morality in this context has to take place and make the argument about how morality is a form of altruistic and cooperative behaviour. Moral behaviour will be taken to be one that benefits the others as well as oneself. Egoism and morality are not exclusive of each other. Moral theory will be viewed from a teleological perspective and morality will be argued to lead to distributional justice.

Methodologically, the research question incorporates two theoretical paradigms: methodological individualism and methodological holism. The concept of collective action games represents methodological individualism. Theories of redistributive justice and political and moral philosophy are methodologically holistic. Moreover, maximising utility through cooperation relates to society as a whole and from this aspect a holistic methodological approach will be used. Functionalism and evolutionary game theory can be combined with moral philosophy and provide an account for human behaviour both on individual and collective level. The use of game theoretical models and complexity science, can make the argument that moving from the analysis of the individual to that of society in an inter-generational time frame, cooperative behaviour is the only rational one. For instance in the Prisoners' Dilemma game, although it pays one to defect if the other agent cooperates, cooperation in the long term is the maximising strategy. The second time these agents will be in the same situation, cooperation will be an established pattern that maximises collective utility.

This is not a novel theme in political philosophy. It can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers and Rousseau, Hume and Hobbes. D. Gauthier, D. Axelrod, B. Skyrms, R. Sugden and K. Binmore have made the most explicit contributions on this field recently. But social choice theory, utility theory, theories of redistribution and justice also have to be taken into account. Therefore we will have to consider the work of Hardin, Taylor, Roemer, Harsanyi, Sen, Skyrms, Rawls, Olson and Arrow. Furthermore, we will have to look into the work of scholars such as Diane Richards when talking about complexity in the social science. In addition, evolutionary biology theory and especially the work of R. Dawkins can offer valuable insights into altruism.

Comparing and analysing the related work and viewing it as part of the same discipline, can be an original thesis. Moreover, using complexity theory to examine moral rational behaviour from a holistic perspective is an original idea. Finally, evolution theories from biology, although used in social science explanation before, have not been explicitly linked to moral philosophy and rational choice theory. This is originally a political philosophy issue. However, it would be interesting to examine the possibilities of practical applications. One of the main elements of cooperation is wealth redistribution. In turn, theories of redistributive justice have obvious and immediate effects on policy. Combining theoretical-philosophical aspects with possible practical applications can contribute to theories of welfare, public policy and international relations.

References

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