Morals by Agreement - Review

The “Gauthier Project” and its critics

Gauthier introduces a theory of morals based on rational choice. His principle project is to reconcile rational choice theory with morality. In order to achieve this, he uses contractarian methodology. The social contract is an agreement by rational utility maximising actors. Morality evolves as a product of the rational rules of this contract. Gauthier also attempts to reconcile natural law with the social contract. Following Hobbes, he speaks of interactions in the state of nature. These are not irrelevant. Natural behaviour is selfish. Behaviour in the social contract should be moral. Should he manage to show that morality has rational grounds, he succeeds in both his enterprises.
Bargaining and compliance are the two major concepts in Morals by Agreement. They are obviously linked. Compliance should be the result of a successful bargain. And it should lead to a fair society; that is a fair distribution of the cooperative surplus. The social contract provides a mechanism to divide the cooperative surplus. Interaction among individuals in society creates a product that can be shared in a number of different ways. Gauthier argues that in order for the contract to be viable, it has to be based on rational premises. Given a set of principles, the rationality of the contract ensures its morality as well. Put differently, Morals by Agreement is a contractarian theory of justice.
This is an improvement on Hobbes’ contractarianism. Gauthier mentions Leviathan seldom and Hobbes’ influence is apparent throughout the book. However, coercion is not part of Morals by Agreement. Gauthier replaces Hobbes sovereign with voluntary rational agreement to comply with the contract. Moreover, Gauthier is influenced by modern moral philosophers and contractarians such as Rawls and Harsanyi. He compares and contrasts his with their theories. He also uses their theories as a tool to construct his. He proves their arguments either to be wrong or insufficient, as a way to justify the need for a rational theory of morality.
There are five basic conceptions in Morals by Agreement; a morally free zone, the minimax relative concession, constrained maximisation, the Lockean Proviso and the Archimedean point. These are the premises Gauthier bases his theory upon. Especially, the minimax relative concession, constrained maximisation and the Lockean Proviso are the most innovative parts of his theory and the one we should focus on, in order to understand his argument.
The purpose of this essay is to provide an overview of the ‘Gauthier Project’. Thus, it will not include an analysis of the first and last chapters of Morals by Agreement. Chapters II and III are concerned with laying the background of the theory. They are an explanation of how Gauthier understands rational choice theory and its premises. Chapters IX – XI are concerned with practical applications of the theory.

Market failure leads to the need for cooperation. Cooperation requires moral constraints on rational behaviour such as the minimax relative concession and the Lockean proviso. Gauthier starts from showing how an ideal market would be a morally free zone. In an ideal market all persons are affected by interaction in the same way. Hence the market is impartial. And for Gauthier impartiality coincides with morality. However, there are no ideal markets. Markets fail by creating externalities and we need cooperative interaction to correct these failures. In order for cooperation among rational actors to be optimal and fair, there is a need for moral constraints on behaviour. The Lockean proviso ensures justice, by not allowing more powerful actors to take advantage of weaker ones. The minimax relative concession sets the rules for a fair bargaining procedure. This is essential for the construction of a fair society. This is a broad overview of the main concepts in Morals by Agreement.
Gauthier has used traditional contract theory and combined it with moral philosophy. This is what distinguishes him from other contractarianists. In addition, Gauthier has used a game theoretic approach to describe rational actors. He also described the bargaining process through game theory. These are the probably the elements that make his book so innovative.
Gauthier’s contract theory describes how it would be possible to reach an agreement about social interactions. It starts from a natural state and through bargaining reaches the social contract. The social contract is based on moral norms deriving from rational bargaining. Moral norms are the product of rational bargaining and compliance with them depends on individual rationality.
Morals by Agreement has come under a lot of criticism for failing to derive a moral theory from rationality. The moral constraints Gauthier introduces are unacceptable for rational choice theorists. Thus, his theory has to be purified in a sense so that it will be a theory of moral philosophy out of rational choice that is not based on moral constraints. Binmore, Sugden, Skyrms have contributed in the same area of Political Philosophy as Gauthier. Their starting point though is Economics and Social Science and therefore their methodology is different. They make similar assumptions about rationality and they conclude that it is possible for agents to behave based on a rational morality. However, they do not use moral constraints; at least not the way Gauthier does. In this sense, they are more successful in following the conventions of rationality and using them to create a theory of rational morality. Their analysis uses evolutionary game theory. As opposed to Gauthier, who sees social contract as the result of an agreement, they see it as having developed through social interaction. Morality is embedded in interaction and becomes a norm once interaction becomes frequent enough. After having examined Gauthier’s theory, the next logical step is to look at the work of evolutionary game theorists and see how they relate it to morality.



REFERENCES
Braithwaite, Richard Theory of games as a tool for the theory of the moral philosopher, An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in Cambridge on 2 December 1954
Den Hartogh, Govert, ‘The Rationality of Conditional Cooperation’,
Erkenntnis, Vol. 38, pp. 405-427

Frankel Paul, Ellen et al. (1988), The New social contract: Essays on Gauthier, Oxford; New York: B. Blackwell for the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University.
Gauthier, David and Sugden, Robert, (1989), Rationality, justice and the social contract: Themes from Morals by agreement, London, etc., Harvester, 1993.
Gauthier, David (1987), Morals by Agreement, Oxford, Oxford U.P.
Hampton, Jean, (1986), Hobbes and the social contract tradition, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kelly, Paul (eds.) (1998), Impartiality, neutrality and justice: re-reading Brian Barry’s Justice as impartiality
Koons, Robert ‘Gauthier and the Rationality of Justice’,
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 76, pp. 1-26

Rawls, John (2005), A theory of justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
Vallentyne, Peter (1991), Contractarianism and rational choice, New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
http://plato.stanford.edu, Entries on contractarianism, game theory and ethics

Gauthier's Project: Morals by Agreement

There are five basic conceptions in Gauthier's theory in "Morals by Agreement":
1. A morally free zone
2. A theory of rational bargaining, including bargaining and the principles on which the initial position is decided.
3.The idea of contstrained maximisation
4. The Proviso
5. The Archimedean Point

Before dealing with these issues, he discusses Choice and Strategy. I think he merely defines them in order to suit the core of his theory which follows.

As for the theory itself, I might be missing something but I was wondering whether the initial condition is the result of the a rational bargaining procedure or the point at which the agreement is reached. It seems that Gauthier suggests the former. However, wouldn't it more plausible that the initial position would itseld be one of the outcomes from the bargaining? Wouldn't that make it easier to reach a rational agreement?

Morality and Game Theory

Rational is often mistaken for egoistic but there can be a rational altruism, if we consider behaviour in the long term. Game Theory and specifically evolutionary and cooperation games can show this is true. Incorporating theories of morality into game theory can show that there exists a relationship between morality and game theoretical models. Moral is understood to be cooperative and the main purpose of cooperation to be redistribution. Cooperation in society can be examined with the use of n-person supergame models as well as the science of complexity. Moreover, theories of evolution can be helpful in understanding social behaviour. The outcome should be a normative theory providing rational incentives for individuals to behave morally.

Morality is not always a straightforward idea. A discussion defining morality in this context has to take place and make the argument about how morality is a form of altruistic and cooperative behaviour. Moral behaviour will be taken to be one that benefits the others as well as oneself. Egoism and morality are not exclusive of each other. Moral theory will be viewed from a teleological perspective and morality will be argued to lead to distributional justice.

Methodologically, the research question incorporates two theoretical paradigms: methodological individualism and methodological holism. The concept of collective action games represents methodological individualism. Theories of redistributive justice and political and moral philosophy are methodologically holistic. Moreover, maximising utility through cooperation relates to society as a whole and from this aspect a holistic methodological approach will be used. Functionalism and evolutionary game theory can be combined with moral philosophy and provide an account for human behaviour both on individual and collective level. The use of game theoretical models and complexity science, can make the argument that moving from the analysis of the individual to that of society in an inter-generational time frame, cooperative behaviour is the only rational one. For instance in the Prisoners' Dilemma game, although it pays one to defect if the other agent cooperates, cooperation in the long term is the maximising strategy. The second time these agents will be in the same situation, cooperation will be an established pattern that maximises collective utility.

This is not a novel theme in political philosophy. It can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers and Rousseau, Hume and Hobbes. D. Gauthier, D. Axelrod, B. Skyrms, R. Sugden and K. Binmore have made the most explicit contributions on this field recently. But social choice theory, utility theory, theories of redistribution and justice also have to be taken into account. Therefore we will have to consider the work of Hardin, Taylor, Roemer, Harsanyi, Sen, Skyrms, Rawls, Olson and Arrow. Furthermore, we will have to look into the work of scholars such as Diane Richards when talking about complexity in the social science. In addition, evolutionary biology theory and especially the work of R. Dawkins can offer valuable insights into altruism.

Comparing and analysing the related work and viewing it as part of the same discipline, can be an original thesis. Moreover, using complexity theory to examine moral rational behaviour from a holistic perspective is an original idea. Finally, evolution theories from biology, although used in social science explanation before, have not been explicitly linked to moral philosophy and rational choice theory. This is originally a political philosophy issue. However, it would be interesting to examine the possibilities of practical applications. One of the main elements of cooperation is wealth redistribution. In turn, theories of redistributive justice have obvious and immediate effects on policy. Combining theoretical-philosophical aspects with possible practical applications can contribute to theories of welfare, public policy and international relations.

References

A. Sen -Utilitarianism and beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1982.

B. Skyrms -The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

C. Bicchieri et al -The dynamics of norms, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

D. Gauthier -Rationality, justice and the social contract: themes from Morals by agreement, London, etc., Harvester, 1993.

D. Gauthier -Moral Dealing, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990.

D. Gauthier and R. Sugden -Morals by Agreement, London, etc., Harvester, 1993.

D. Richards -Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, University of Michigan Press 2000

E. Frankel et al -The New social contract: Essays on Gauthier, Oxford; New York: B. Blackwell for the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, 1988.

G.Hardin -The Tragedy of the Commons in Science, New Series, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (Dec. 13, 1968), pp. 1243-1248

http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html -Entries on contractarianism, game theory and ethics, economic justice

J. Diamond -Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Viking Adult, 2004

J. Harsanyi -Essays on ethics, social behavior, and scientific explanation, Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., c1976.

J. Harsanyi -Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations, Cambridge [Eng.]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

J. Kraus and J. Colem -Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice in Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Jul., 1987), pp. 715-749

J. Rawls -A theory of justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005.

J. Roemer -Theories of Distributive Justice, Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1996.

J. Surowiecki -The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations

K. Binmore -Reply to Robert Sugden in The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 469, Features (Feb., 2001), pp. F244-F248

K. Binmore -Game theory and the social contract volumes I, II, Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1994.

K. Binmore -Natural Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

K. Dowding -How not to use evolutionary theory in politics, British Journal of Political Science, 2:1, 72-80 (2000)

M. Hollis -The Philosophy of Social Science: An introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994

M. Olson -The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1971.

P. Ball -Critical Mass , W. Heinemann, Great Britain, 2000

P. Danielson -Modelling rationality, morality, and evolution, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

P. Vallentyne -Contractarianism and rational choice, New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, c1991.

R. Axelrod -The evolution of cooperation, London; New York: Penguin Books, 1990.

R. Braithwaite -Theory of games as a tool for the theory of the moral philosopher, An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in Cambridge on 2 December 1954

R. Dawkins -The selfish gene, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

R. Dworkin -Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Harvard University Press (2000)

R. Sugden -Spontaneous Order in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn, 1989), pp. 85-97

R. Sugden -Ken Binmore's Evolutionary Social Theory in The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 469, Features (Feb., 2001), pp. F213-F243

R. Sugden -The economics of rights, co-operation, and welfare, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004